This paper is based on a semantic foundation of quantum logic which makes use of dialog-games. In the first part of the paper the dialogic method is introduced and under the conditions of quantum mechanical measurements the rules of a dialog-game about quantum mechanical propositions are established. In the second part of the paper the quantum mechanical dialog-game is replaced by a calculus of quantum logic. As the main part of the paper we show that the calculus of quantum logic (...) is complete and consistent with respect to the dialogic semantics. Since the dialoggame does not involve the 'excluded middle' the calculus represents a calculus of effective (intuitionistic) quantum logic. In a forthcoming paper it is shown that this calculus is equivalent to a calculus of sequents and more interestingly to a calculus of propositions. With the addition of the 'excluded middle' the latter calculus is a model for the lattice of subspaces of a Hilbert space. (shrink)

A recent addition to the growing corpus of Frege literature is Reinhardt Grossmann's metaphysical study of Frege's philosophical theories. Grossmann approaches Frege as a metaphysician whose philosophical concern centers around four main problems: the nature of logic, the analysis of various kinds of propositions, identity and truth. He has a genetic view of Frege's answers to these problems, and this is reflected in the arrangement and content of the chapters. In chapter I, Grossmann considers Frege's introduction of these problems in (...) the Begriffsschrift and his initial attempt at solutions in terms of the distinctions between thinking and judging, sentence and content, concept and object, function and argument. Grossmann here diagnoses Frege's alleged failure to recognize states of affairs as the fundamental shortcoming of these early views. (shrink)

Our results concern the existence of a countable extension U of the countable atomless Boolean algebra B such that U is a "nonconstructive" extension of B. It is known that for any fixed admissible indexing φ of B there is a countable nonconstructive extension U of B (relative to φ). The main theorem here shows that there exists an extension U of B such that for any admissible indexing φ of B, U is nonconstructive (relative to φ). Thus, in this (...) sense U is a countable totally nonconstructive extension of B. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:139. COULD AN IMPRESSION BE A PROCESS? Processes are of two main kinds, depending on whether the process has or lacks culmination. I am concerned with non-culminating processes, e.g., with a burning fuse sans explosion. This is reported as secondary by any good dictionary, derived from the head, or culminating, sense of 'process'. An ontological criterion for 'process' is as follows: something is absolutely unchanging, if it is unchanging (...) in every sense of the word. Those who hold that, e.g., a monotonous sound is absolutely unchanging hold that in an absolutely unchanging universe there is no reason why there should not be such a sound. Like any absolutely unchanging existent, a sound is caught, so to speak, in an instantaneous freeze on all change. Those who opt for process hold that change is, so to speak, of its essence. Hence, in an absolutely unchanging world, there could not be a process. The question I wish to raise is not whether there are processes, and certainly not whether Hume opts for processes. It is doubtful that Hume entertained the question of process. Indeed, that is the point. One of Hume's main commentators, R. W. Church, holds that Hume's perceptual atoms, defined by his dictum that distinguishability mutually entails separability, as well as their philosophical relations, are incompatible with the thesis that "experiences exist not in succession but in process." Church goes on to say that it is "difficult to see how... 'process' can have meaning for Hume. He plainly holds perceptions and their contents to be successive merely. I begin by considering Church's reason why Hume must reject processes, and then consider an additional reason drawn from Hume's account of time. Specifically, 140. divisibility òf time terminates in unchanging atoms. The essence of process is change. Hence, no temporal atom is a process. Neither reason, I argue, suffices for holding that impressions and processes are mutually exclusive. Hume holds that distinguishability mutually entails separability. Church holds that this dictum defines Hume's perceptual atomism. To highlight the atomism it is supposed to define, he rewords it, as follows: "Whatever is distinguishable is intrinsically self-identical and therefore self-contained." What does this rewording mean? According to Church, Hume, in the body of the Treatise, holds that resemblance is qualitative identity distributed, numerically, over many complexes. "On Hume's theory of abstract ideas, 'resemblance' is a verbal term referring (in virtue of habits of association) to any case of a qualitative 4 identity numerically distributed." Further, the qualitative identity in question is not relative to any difference from another quality, Bradley to the contrary notwithstanding. Difference, for Hume, is incompatible with relation and it is itself not a relation. It follows, according to Church, that Hume's absolute self-identity mutually entails self -containment. So much for Church's version of Hume's perceptual atomism. Is it incompatible with process, as Church claims? A trombone's slide illustrates non-culminating process with succession. Let us use it as a basis for an account. A trombone's slide is unbroken not only qua sound but qua pitch. Nevertheless, it incorporates pitch multiplicity. By "successive merely" does Church mean that the transition from pitch to pitch must be broken, contrary to what is heard, and, for this reason, Hume cannot account for the slide qua process? If so, he is mistaken. 141. Distinguishability mutually entails separability for Hume, but this does not mean that the transition from pitch to pitch cannot be experienced as a slide. In fact, it is easy to show that a trombone's slide conforms to Hume's dictum, by reason of the just noticeable difference and Hume's philosophical relation of contiguity in time. We are dealing with three notions: first, distinction, and, in particular, how pitches in the slide are distinguished. Second, separability, and, in particular, how separation corresponding to distinction is guaranteed by the fact of process. Third, slide, and, in particular how Hume's philosophical relation of temporal contiguity, coupled with the just noticeable difference, guarantees phenomenal slide. I take up these three notions in the order mentioned. The distinction between two pitches in the trombone's slide is... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:61. HUME'S GEOMETRIC "OBJECTS" Arithmetic and algebra allow of precision and certainty. The science of geometry is not likewise a perfect and infallible science. At any rate, this is Hume's teaching in the Treatise. When two numbers are so combin ' d, as that the one has always an unite answering to every unite of the other, we pronounce them equal; and 'tis for want of such a standard (...) of equality in extension, that geometry can scarce be esteem'd a perfect and infallible science. 1 The ideas of, say, equality and right line shade into· inequality and curve. It must not be supposed, however, that the vagueness of these ideas renders all judgments uncertain and fallible. 'Tie evident, that the eye, or rather the mind is often able at one view to determine the proportions of bodies....Such judgments are not only common, but in many cases certain and infallible. (T47) Nevertheless, geometry is a fallible science because its essential ideas are vague. Vagueness, due to lack of boundaries between ideas, is in the ideas themselves. For this reason, 'tis impossible to produce any definition of them, which will fix the precise boundaries betwixt them. (T49) (Yet, some forty pages earlier Hume argued at length that the mind cannot form any notion of quantity or quality without forming a precise notion of the degrees of each [T18]) As far as the Treatise goes, geometry is the science of measurement and as such it must allow for error. Even if precise geometric standards could be had, they would not make the propositions of geometry certain. Thus, we might precisely define a right line by a rule of order of indivisible points. But geometry, construed as the science of measurement, would not be perfected. Nor, if it were (the standard), is there any such firmness in our senses or imagination, as to determine when such an order is violated or preserv ' d. The original standard of a right line is in reality nothing but a certain general appearance. (T52) 62. In the Enquiries, Hume continues to hold that notions essential to geometry, for example, equality, right line, and so on, are sensibles. But they are no longer generic appearances. They are determinate. The great advantage of the mathematical sciences above the moral consists in this, that the ideas of the former, being sensible, are always clear and determinate... even when no definition is employed, the object itself may be presented to the senses, and by that means be steadily and clearly apprehended. 2 In addition, geometry is no longer merely the science of measurement. The truths of Euclid, Hume holds, would remain truths even if there were no figures in nature. Though there never were a circle or triangle in nature, the truths demonstrated by Euclid would for ever retain their certainty and evidence. (EHU25) Professor Zabeeh, in his commentary on Hume, holds that Hume did not mean to imply that Euclid could dispense with the observation of figures. However, whenever possible Hume should be taken at his word: observation of figures is not a truth condition for propositions of geometry. A distinction must be drawn between discovery conditions and what Hume calls the "truth or evidence" of a geometric proposition. We may suppose that observation of figures is a discovery condition. But it is hardly a truth condition. The certainty, as opposed to the discovery, of geometric propositions does not depend on the existence in nature of any figure. I am mainly concerned, however, with Professor Zabeeh' s account of how, according to Hume, geometric propositions retain their certainty and evidence in the face of recalcitrant experience. Noting that Hume does not "fully explain," he gives the real reason for Hume's belief in the apodeictic certainty of mathematical truths. He appears to assume we never allow such truths to be controverted by empirical evidence. That is to say, if perchance we find, by measurement, that the sum of the angles of a Euclidean triangle 63. does not equal 180 degrees, either we say that we measured wrongly or we say that the triangle we have been measuring is not Euclidean.4 This formulation of Hume's reason avoids... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:61. HUME'S GEOMETRIC "OBJECTS" Arithmetic and algebra allow of precision and certainty. The science of geometry is not likewise a perfect and infallible science. At any rate, this is Hume's teaching in the Treatise. When two numbers are so combin ' d, as that the one has always an unite answering to every unite of the other, we pronounce them equal; and 'tis for want of such a standard (...) of equality in extension, that geometry can scarce be esteem'd a perfect and infallible science. 1 The ideas of, say, equality and right line shade into· inequality and curve. It must not be supposed, however, that the vagueness of these ideas renders all judgments uncertain and fallible. 'Tie evident, that the eye, or rather the mind is often able at one view to determine the proportions of bodies....Such judgments are not only common, but in many cases certain and infallible. (T47) Nevertheless, geometry is a fallible science because its essential ideas are vague. Vagueness, due to lack of boundaries between ideas, is in the ideas themselves. For this reason, 'tis impossible to produce any definition of them, which will fix the precise boundaries betwixt them. (T49) (Yet, some forty pages earlier Hume argued at length that the mind cannot form any notion of quantity or quality without forming a precise notion of the degrees of each [T18]) As far as the Treatise goes, geometry is the science of measurement and as such it must allow for error. Even if precise geometric standards could be had, they would not make the propositions of geometry certain. Thus, we might precisely define a right line by a rule of order of indivisible points. But geometry, construed as the science of measurement, would not be perfected. Nor, if it were (the standard), is there any such firmness in our senses or imagination, as to determine when such an order is violated or preserv ' d. The original standard of a right line is in reality nothing but a certain general appearance. (T52) 62. In the Enquiries, Hume continues to hold that notions essential to geometry, for example, equality, right line, and so on, are sensibles. But they are no longer generic appearances. They are determinate. The great advantage of the mathematical sciences above the moral consists in this, that the ideas of the former, being sensible, are always clear and determinate... even when no definition is employed, the object itself may be presented to the senses, and by that means be steadily and clearly apprehended. 2 In addition, geometry is no longer merely the science of measurement. The truths of Euclid, Hume holds, would remain truths even if there were no figures in nature. Though there never were a circle or triangle in nature, the truths demonstrated by Euclid would for ever retain their certainty and evidence. (EHU25) Professor Zabeeh, in his commentary on Hume, holds that Hume did not mean to imply that Euclid could dispense with the observation of figures. However, whenever possible Hume should be taken at his word: observation of figures is not a truth condition for propositions of geometry. A distinction must be drawn between discovery conditions and what Hume calls the "truth or evidence" of a geometric proposition. We may suppose that observation of figures is a discovery condition. But it is hardly a truth condition. The certainty, as opposed to the discovery, of geometric propositions does not depend on the existence in nature of any figure. I am mainly concerned, however, with Professor Zabeeh' s account of how, according to Hume, geometric propositions retain their certainty and evidence in the face of recalcitrant experience. Noting that Hume does not "fully explain," he gives the real reason for Hume's belief in the apodeictic certainty of mathematical truths. He appears to assume we never allow such truths to be controverted by empirical evidence. That is to say, if perchance we find, by measurement, that the sum of the angles of a Euclidean triangle 63. does not equal 180 degrees, either we say that we measured wrongly or we say that the triangle we have been measuring is not Euclidean.4 This formulation of Hume's reason avoids... (shrink)

" Although a historical organization is employed wherever a particular movement unfolds from earlier movements, the text's main organization is not motivated by ...

In his commentary, Oaksford makes two main claims: (1) that the externalisation method used by Green, Over, and Pyne (1997) enforces the correlation observed between probability estimates and selection, and (2) that these estimates support the prediction of a downward revision of P(p) when P(p) > P(q). In this reply, we rebut claim 1 by describing the instructions more comprehensively, and claim 2 by reiterating the importance of making certain theoretical distinctions which Oaksford does not make. Our interest is the (...) psychological process of reaching decision: externalisation methods provide a means of exploring this process and of assessing the value of Bayesian approaches. (shrink)

In this article, an ethical analysis of an educational programme on renal replacement therapy options for patients and their social network is presented. The two main spearheads of this approach are: (1) offering an educational programme on all renal replacement therapy options ahead of treatment requirement and (2) a home-based approach involving the family and friends of the patient. Arguments are offered for the ethical justification of this approach by considering the viewpoint of the various stakeholders involved. Finally, reflecting on (...) these ethical considerations, essential conditions for carrying out such a programme are outlined. The goal is to develop an ethically justified and responsible educational programme. (shrink)

Decisions related to animal welfare standards depend on farmer’s multiple goals and values and are constrained by a wide range of external and internal forces. The aim of this paper is twofold, i.e., to develop a theoretical framework for farmers’ AW decisions that incorporates farmers’ goals, use and non-use values and to present an approach to empirically implement the theoretical framework. The farmer as a head of the farm household makes choices regarding production to maximize the utility of the household. (...) The overall utility of the farmer is determined by his multiple objectives. For the analysis of multi-objective problems, the multiple criteria decision - making paradigm provides an appropriate theoretical framework. However, theories from the field of social-psychology are needed to facilitate the identification of all relevant aspects in the decision making. The practical use of the conceptual framework is demonstrated using a simple numerical application of a multi-objective programming model. Two workshops were devoted to examining the scientific consistency and the practical usefulness of the approach. Implementing this approach will increase knowledge of the main factors and barriers that determine farmers’ decisions with regard to AW standards. This knowledge is relevant during the development of new AW concepts that aims to supply products that comply with above-legal AW standards for middle-market segments. (shrink)

The idea of organism, which of recent years has bulked so largely in scientific, and especially in biological, theory has been developed mainly in reference to living organisms, and has been extended to cover such systems as human societies, crystals, molecules and atoms—and indeed the whole universe has been interpreted as an organism. This use of the term, however, includes different ways in which parts may be together in a system. The belief that the principle of organism has been wrongly (...) extended to explain certain co-ordinations of vital processes which require a different type of explanation is the reason for this addition to the immense literature on the subject of organism. (shrink)

"Aristotle was a systematic writer who often cross-referred to the definitions of terms given elsewhere in his work. Book 5 of the Metaphysics is important because it consists of definitions of the main uses of key terms in Aristotle's philosophy, and it is extremely valuable to have a commentary on this important text by Alexander of Aphrodisias, the leading commentator of his school. Alexander provides a detailed commentary on all of the thirty terms analysed in Book 5, weighing alternative interpretations (...) of what Aristotle says one against another, defending Peripatetic views against actual and possible criticisms, and attempting to integrate what is said in Book 5 into the context of the Metaphysics as a whole."--Bloomsbury Publishing. (shrink)

Why do humans make music? Theories of the evolution of musicality have focused mainly on the value of music for specific adaptive contexts such as mate selection, parental care, coalition signaling, and group cohesion. Synthesizing and extending previous proposals, we argue that social bonding is an overarching function that unifies all of these theories, and that musicality enabled social bonding at larger scales than grooming and other bonding mechanisms available in ancestral primate societies. We combine cross-disciplinary evidence from archeology, anthropology, (...) biology, musicology, psychology, and neuroscience into a unified framework that accounts for the biological and cultural evolution of music. We argue that the evolution of musicality involves gene–culture coevolution, through which proto-musical behaviors that initially arose and spread as cultural inventions had feedback effects on biological evolution because of their impact on social bonding. We emphasize the deep links between production, perception, prediction, and social reward arising from repetition, synchronization, and harmonization of rhythms and pitches, and summarize empirical evidence for these links at the levels of brain networks, physiological mechanisms, and behaviors across cultures and across species. Finally, we address potential criticisms and make testable predictions for future research, including neurobiological bases of musicality and relationships between human music, language, animal song, and other domains. The music and social bonding hypothesis provides the most comprehensive theory to date of the biological and cultural evolution of music. (shrink)

Abstract‘Yellow Rain’, an alleged biological warfare agent thought to be utilized in parts of both South East Asia and Afghanistan, may be composed in part of the mycotoxins, trichothecenes. However, more recent analyses suggest that the ‘Rain’ was mainly honey bee excreta. The history of the controversy together with the biological effects, chemistry as well as the fungi producing these mycotoxins and agricultural commodities affected by trichothecenes are reviewed.

The first of twelve fascicles to be published quarterly and as a single volume at the end of the series. This fascicle presents Weiss's philosophic journal from June 24th to September 21st, 1955. The main problem worried with in these pages is that of the togetherness of the basic modes of being, a central issue for a systematic pluralist such as Weiss. We see him approaching the problem from different angles, pushing ideas as far as they will go, testing them (...) against other parts of his system, revising, rejecting and refining. At times Weiss sketches out the logical permutations and combinations of his leading themes and then seeks out applications in more concrete subject matter. At other times a seemingly unrelated analysis of something as concrete as the relations between men and women is used to illumine highly abstract problems. The fascicle as a whole is a study in the logic of opposition and togetherness, though many other points are touched along the way, such as the problem of simple location. Weiss's analysis is more mathematical and logical than linguistic. It is remarkably thorough and radical, free and original. But precisely because of this, it is also difficult to follow, at times even frustratingly opaque. But the fascicles do provide two things: a valuable dialectical key to Modes of Being, and a clear insight into the working methods and style of thought of one of the most creative of contemporary philosophers.--W. G. E. (shrink)

Pearson points to the radical questioning of the traditional Greek ethic, which is found in the classical dramatic literature of fifth century Athens, as an example of popular ethics. The philosophic discussion of the Socratic-Platonic tradition supplanted this popular ethics in the fourth century. Many of the problems discussed in the philosophic literature were taken over as developed and articulated by the classical dramatists. Thus, three ethical traditions are described and related in this book: the "traditional" ethics coming from Homer, (...) Hesiod, and Solon, the "popular" ethics of the classical dramatists, and the technical "philosophic" ethics of Plato. The main effort of the book is to discuss the popular ethics as related to both the traditional and philosophic ethics The student of the Platonic dialogues will find the book of great value in identifying the various positions represented by the dramatis personae of the dialogues.--W. G. E. (shrink)

This study explores linkages between what Chinese managers generally know about environmental issues, how strongly they value environmental protection, and different types of behaviours/actions they may take within their organizations on behalf of the environment. From a sample of 305 managers in Guangzhou and Beijing, it was found that both environmental knowledge and values are more predictive of more personal managerial behaviours, such as keeping informed of relevant company issues and working within the system to minimize environmental impacts, than more (...) overt behaviours. Moreover, for these more personal actions, environmental knowledge and values were found to have both main and interactive effects. By comparison, it was found that both environmental values and knowledge had additive effects on managerial tendencies to initiate new programs within their domain of responsibility. Only environmental values was found to have a modest influence environmental advocacy. (shrink)

When one becomes aware of the stated aim of this short text, he is not so prone to view with surprise the territory it claims to cover, for Hackett tells us that he is not attempting a learned treatise but wishes "to spread a feast of insight for the common man who is at the same time deeply thoughtful and profoundly concerned with the cumulative, total human understanding of the meaning of existence". The "feast" includes two main dishes and two (...) lesser ones plus three short desserts. The main course has a substantial chapter on "Buddhism: A Philosophy of Enlightenment" followed by "Hinduism: A Philosophy of Release." The meal opens with two relatively brief chapters: "Confucianism: A Philosophy of Ethical Idealism" and "Taoism: A Philosophy of Mystical Oneness and Self-Transcendence." The dessert is in the form of three brief appendices, one on Jainism, another on Indian materialism and the third on Reincarnation. A helpful glossary clarifies terms, some of which are not even tasted in the earlier portions. The index is careful; the selected bibliography is much too short. Fine-print marginal summaries throughout the book help the digestive processes. (shrink)

This study explores the relationship between moral intensity and the use of different sensemaking strategies in military critical incidents. First, narratives of military personnel were used to select prototypical high/low moral intensity critical incidents. In a follow-up, a scenario study was conducted with active duty military personnel to examine the relationship between moral intensity and the use of sensemaking tactics. This study offers three main conclusions. First, the use of sensemaking tactics is strongly tied to the level of moral intensity (...) in the situation. In high-intense situations, the servicemen draw on previous experiences, prediction of consequences, and help of others to recognize and interpret the situation. Less attention goes out to higher level critical thinking. Thus, it seems that in these critical incidents, the servicemen react without giving room for thorough consideration and deliberation. Second, the number of deployments a serviceman experienced influences the perceived seriousness and harmfulness of the situation negatively in low-intense situations. Finally, and in line with earlier studies, the results indicate that the concept of moral intensity is formed out of three rather than the six dimensions originally proposed by Jones. The implications of these findings are discussed. (shrink)

Kneller's main concern is that, "If we are to understand the problems, policies, and concepts of education, we must first examine carefully the language of educational discourse." This book is a sober and readable review of several problems in modern philosophy, in which are revealed some of the strategies used by the giants of language philosophy to analyze difficult philosophical propositions and paradoxes. Each chapter of historical exposition is paralleled with a chapter of applications to problems in educational philosophy. The (...) early part of the book is a review of John Dewey's central theses, plus a few words on research methodology in general, both of which are related to the conduct of classroom lessons; the second part of the book, which Kneller calls "Formal Analysis," is an exceedingly competent precis of work in the philosophy of science, especially Wittgenstein's and Carnap's, followed by a series of important caveats to educational researchers, reminding them of some of the serious problems of inference and generalization in the behavioral sciences; the third section, featuring Ryle, Austin, and Strawson, is called "Informal Analysis," and is principally a discussion of "ordinary language" philosophy, with applications to the familiar clichés and slogans of school administrators and politicians. Kneller favors this last group, since he feels that informal analysis is more "practical and humane," and his feelings are supported by some current conflicts between hard and soft educational research. The basic exhortation of this book, though, is that people who talk and think about education should be more philosophically competent about it, even if their philosophical blunders have not yet affected their ability to teach and make policy. He maintains that educational philosophy will not add anything new to the educational universe, but rather, clarify what is already there.—E. H. W. (shrink)

In his previous book, La philosophie et les experiences naturelles, A. De Waelhens claims that great philosophers in the past have not only been in dialogue with their predecessors but also that each great philosopher benefited from a confrontation with a non-philosophical experience. This previous book forms the theoretical justification for the present one. Here the author studies the problem of psychosis, with the hope and the intention of contributing to the further development of philosophy. Insofar as philosophy is fascinated (...) with the obligation "Learn to know yourself" or the search for an answer for the question "Who am I," insofar so claims the author, contemporary philosophy cannot afford to bypass psychoanalysis. The book has six chapters and a conclusion, but could easily be divided in three parts. The first part is a survey of the general approach to psychosis and schizophrenia by a selected group of European psychiatrists. The author indicates the crucial shortcomings of each approach and shows how there is among them a gradual turning away from a physiological interpretation of schizophrenia and psychosis towards a psychological one. In Part II, the author uses mainly the theory of Lacan and his disciples to present a coherent theory of psychosis. The crucial concepts are 1) the Oedipus-complex, 2) the mirror stage, 3) the foreclosure of a reference to the father. The Oedipus-complex is well known from Freud’s works although it receives here a more structural interpretation. The mirror stage refers to the events around 6-8 months when the child has to appropriate himself as a unified body, not just a collection of partial elements. This task can be noticed easily when one observes the attitude of the child towards the mirror. Hence the name. In order to perform this task successfully the child needs the support of the mother. The function of the mother is still more important for the third problem: a reference to the father. A healthy development of the child requires that the mother is capable of recognizing and of acknowledging the part played by the father in the creation of the child. This is done in our culture by giving the child the name of the father. Mothers of psychotics often are emotionally unable to tolerate that. They want to situate their child exclusively in relation to themselves: they foreclose any reference to the father. Psychosis is therefore related to the foreclosure of the name-of-the-father. These three crucial concepts allow the author to explain the crucial symptoms of schizophrenia, and to compare it with paranoia and paraphrenia. The third part of the book is a philosophical discussion of the problem of psychosis. The author offers the continental philosophical tradition as a better intellectual framework to study psychosis than the physical framework that Freud used in his Project for a Scientific Psychology and that he never completely abandoned. In the conclusion A. De Waelhens summarizes the direct philosophical consequences of the study of psychosis, the most fascinating being that one has to recognize the priority of language in the constitution of the subject, and that there is a meaningful relation between the way I relate to myself, the things and other people. Two improvements could be made in the book. The first is pedagogical: i.e., a critical bibliography of the crucial works of Lacan and his school and of the phenomenological tradition would have been very helpful for any reader not familiar with one of the two streams of thought. A second improvement would be the inclusion in Chapter One of a discussion of the development which has taken place in the U.S.A. in the explanation of schizophrenia. It is parallel with the development in Europe. A useful reference is E. G. Mishler and N. E. Walker: "Family Interaction Processes and Schizophrenia: A Review of Current Theories," in International Journal of Psychiatry, July 1966, Vol. 2, Number 4. Although the book is difficult, it is very insightful and provocative and it certainly merits translation.—W. V. E. (shrink)

According to the subtitle of this anthology, the essays are intended to discuss and explore "the cohesive and disjunctive forces" existing between C. P. Snow's infamous "two cultures" of science and the humanities. As in all the colloquia on this subject, there tends to be a mishmash of problems in definition, with Snow's relatively simple and straightforward contrast lost in the shuffle of terms. The fact that in this volume no one agrees upon what science is tends to limit its (...) ability to solve Snow's problem, but, on the other hand, it offers many ruminations on the various meanings of science. Gyorgy Kepes, for instance, thinks of science mainly as a set of technologically sophisticated instruments and advocates that technicians and visual artists collaborate on the design of "light shows" and other flashy works of modern art, especially the design and execution of environmental art. Harry Levin, the well-known scholar of comparative literature, thinks that the division of intellectual activities into "scientific" and "cultural" might be better replaced with dividing scholars into "generalists" and "specialists," arguing that the human community needs a balanced representation of both camps. Talcott Parsons advocates the incorporation of scientific methods into traditionally humanistic considerations, proposing that social science is the logical amalgam of the two cultures. Parsons, by the way, is more commendable for practicing what he preaches than some of his colleagues in the social sciences, particularly Oscar Handlin, also represented in this volume. Altogether, sixteen points of view are included in the symposium, most filled with sonorous language and unsupported generalizations about matters of historical and current fact, but all of them literate and filled with challenging philosophical puzzles.—E. H. W. (shrink)

The ongoing debate on the ethics of using artificial intelligence (AI) in military contexts has been negatively impacted by the predominant focus on the use of lethal autonomous weapon systems (LAWS) in war. However, AI technologies have a considerably broader scope and present opportunities for decision support optimization across the entire spectrum of the military decision-making process (MDMP). These opportunities cannot be ignored. Instead of mainly focusing on the risks of the use of AI in target engagement, the debate about (...) responsible AI should (i) concern each step in the MDMP, and (ii) take ethical considerations and enhanced performance in military operations into account. A characterization of the debate on responsible AI in the military, considering both machine and human weaknesses and strengths, is provided in this paper. We present inroads into the improvement of the MDMP, and thus military operations, through the use of AI for decision support, taking each quadrant of this characterization into account. (shrink)

Fibring has been shown to be useful for combining logics endowed withtruth-functional semantics. However, the techniques used so far are unableto cope with fibring of logics endowed with non-truth-functional semanticsas, for example, paraconsistent logics. The first main contribution of thepaper is the development of a suitable abstract notion of logic, that mayalso encompass systems with non-truth-functional connectives, and wherefibring can still be dealt with. Furthermore, it is shown that thisextended notion of fibring preserves completeness under certain reasonableconditions. This completeness transfer (...) result, the second main contributionof the paper, generalizes the one established in Zanardo et al. (2001) butis obtained using new techniques that explore the properties of a suitablemeta-logic (conditional equational logic) where the (possibly)non-truth-functional valuations are specified. The modal paraconsistentlogic of da Costa and Carnielli (1988) is studied in the context of this novel notionof fibring and its completeness is so established. (shrink)

The main question that Firestone & Scholl (F&S) pose is whether “what and how we see is functionally independent from what and how we think, know, desire, act, and so forth” (sect. 2, para. 1). We synthesize a collection of concerns from an interdisciplinary set of coauthors regarding F&S's assumptions and appeals to intuition, resulting in their treatment of visual perception as context-free.

In this paper, logics are conceived as two-sorted first-order structures, and we argue that this broad definition encompasses a wide class of logics with theoretical interest as well as interest from the point of view of applications. The language, concepts and methods of model theory can thus be used to describe the relationship between logics through morphisms of structures called transfers. This leads to a formal framework for studying several properties of abstract logics and their attributes such as consequence operator, (...) syntactical structure, and internal transformations. In particular, we treat Belief Revision Systems (BRS) as our main example, defining the Wide Belief Revision Systems (WBRS''s). This generalization allows us to define BRS''s in an abstract setting for classical and non-standard logics. We also show how the concept of translation between logics can be obtained as a particular case of transfers. (shrink)

This volume of newly commissioned essays provides comprehensive coverage of African philosophy, ranging across disciplines and throughout the ages. Offers a distinctive historical treatment of African philosophy. Covers all the main branches of philosophy as addressed in the African tradition. Includes accounts of pre-colonial African philosophy and contemporary political thought.

We summarise and respond to the main points made by the commentators on our target article, which concern: whether structural similarity can play a causal role in normal object identification and in neuropsychological deficits for living things, the nature of our structural knowledge of the world, the relations between sensory and functional knowledge of objects, and the nature of our functional knowledge about living things, whether we need to posit a “core” semantic system, arguments that can be marshalled from evidence (...) on functional imaging, the causal mechanisms by which category differences can emerge in object representations, and the nature of our knowledge about categories other than living and nonliving things. We also highlight points raised in our article that seem to be accepted. (shrink)

Background Genuine uncertainty on superiority of one intervention over the other is called equipoise. Physician-investigators in randomized controlled trials need equipoise at least in studies with more than minimal risks. Ideally, this equipoise is also present in patient-participants. In pediatrics, data on equipoise are lacking. We hypothesize that 1) lack of equipoise at enrolment among parents may reduce recruitment; 2) lack of equipoise during participation may reduce retention in patients assigned to a less favoured treatment-strategy. Methods We compared preferences of (...) parents/patients at enrolment, documented by a questionnaire, with preferences developed during follow-up by an interview-study to investigate equipoise of child-participants and parents in the BeSt-for-Kids-study. This trial in new-onset Juvenile Idiopathic Arthritis-patients consists of three strategies. One strategy comprises initial treatment with a biological disease-modifying-antirheumatic-drug, currently not standard-of-care. Semi-structured interviews were conducted with 23 parents and 7 patients, median 11 months after enrolment. Results Initially most parents and children were not in equipoise. Parents/patients who refused participation, regularly declined due to specific preferences. Many participating families preferred the biological-first-strategy. They participated to have a chance for this initial treatment, and would even consider stopping trial-participation when not randomized for it. Their conviction of superiority of the biological-first strategy was based on knowledge from internet and close relations. According to four parents, the physician-investigator preferred the biological-first-strategy, but the majority stated that she had no preferred strategy. In phase 2, preferences tended to change to the treatment actually received. Conclusions Lack of equipoise during enrolment did not reduce study recruitment, mainly due to the fact that preferred treatment was only available within the study. Still, when developing a trial it is important to evaluate whether the physicians’ research question is in line with preferences of the patient-group. By exploring so-called ‘informed patient-group’-equipoise, successful recruitment may be enhanced and bias avoided. In our study, lack of equipoise during trial-participation did not reduce retention in those assigned to a less favoured option. We observed a change for preference towards treatment actually received, possibly explained by comparable outcomes in all three arms. (shrink)

Some researchers have argued that firms with favorable environmental performance are more likely to provide voluntary environmental disclosure, while others have argued that firms with poor environmental performance are most likely to disclose. The authors propose a curvilinear relation between environmental performance and environmental disclosure that is moderated by visibility. Data were obtained from S&P 500 firms queried by the Ceres’ Climate Disclosure Project. Results show a U-shaped environmental performance–environmental disclosure relation and a main effect for visibility, but no moderating (...) effect for visibility on the U-shaped environmental performance–environmental disclosure rela- tion. The authors discussed the implications of these results for future research and practice. (shrink)

Some researchers have argued that firms with favorable environmental performance are more likely to provide voluntary environmental disclosure, while others have argued that firms with poor environmental performance are most likely to disclose. The authors propose a curvilinear relation between environmental performance and environmental disclosure that is moderated by visibility. Data were obtained from S&P 500 firms queried by Ceres' Climate Disclosure Project. Results show a U-shaped environmental performance—environmental disclosure relation and a main effect for visibility but no moderating effect (...) for visibility on the U-shaped environmental performance-environmental disclosure relation. The authors discussed the implications of these results for future research and practice. (shrink)

The book "Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience" (2003) is an engaging criticism of cognitive neuroscience from the perspective of a Wittgensteinian philosophy of ordinary language. The authors' main claim is that assertions like "the brain sees" and "the left hemisphere thinks" are integral to cognitive neuroscience but that they are meaningless because they commit the mereological fallacy—ascribing to parts of humans, properties that make sense to predicate only of whole humans. The authors claim that this fallacy is at the heart of (...) Cartesian dualism, implying that current cognitive neuroscientists are Cartesian dualists. Against this claim, we argue that the fallacy cannot be committed within Cartesian dualism either, for this doctrine does not allow for an intelligible way of asserting that a soul is part of a human being. Also, the authors' Aristotelian essentialistic outlook is at odds with their Wittgensteinian stance, and we were unconvinced by their case against explanatory reductionism. Finally, although their Wittgensteinian stance is congenial with radical behaviorism, their separation between philosophy and science seems less so because it is based on a view of philosophy as a priori. The authors' emphasis on the a priori, however, does not necessarily commit them to rationalism if it is restricted to conceptual or analytical (as opposed to synthetic) truths. (shrink)

Peter Abelard (1079–1142 ce) was the most wide‐ranging philosopher of the twelfth century. He quickly established himself as a leading teacher of logic in and near Paris shortly after 1100. After his affair with Heloise, and his subsequent castration, Abelard became a monk, but he returned to teaching in the Paris schools until 1140, when his work was condemned by a Church Council at Sens. His logical writings were based around discussion of the “Old Logic”: Porphyry's Isagoge, aristotle'S Categories and (...) On Interpretation and boethius'S textbook on topical inference. They comprise a freestanding Dialectica (“Logic”; probably c.1116), a set of commentaries (known as the Logica [Ingredientibus], c. 1119) and a later (c. 1125) commentary on the Isagoge (Logica Nostrorum Petititoni Sociorum or Glossulae). In a work Abelard called his Theologia, issued in three main versions (between 1120 and c.1134), he attempted a logical analysis of trinitarian relations and explored the philosophical problems surrounding God's claims to omnipotence and omniscience. The Collationes (“Debates,” also known as “Dialogue between a Christian, a Philosopher and a Jew”; probably c.1130) present a rational investigation into the nature of the highest good, in which the Christian and the Philosopher (who seems to be modeled on a philosopher of pagan antiquity) are remarkably in agreement. The unfinished Scito teipsum (“Know thyself,” also known as the “Ethics”; c.1138) analyses moral action. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:BOOK REVIEWS 537 tion of his three dialogues, and of course there are several references to Hume's intern= parable Dialogues. The bibliographic essay is useful with respect to general works and period pieces but unfortunately does little to help those who are seeking further help in understanding an individual writer. Professor France's work is an invaluable guide nevertheless for those who realize that authors, even philosophers, do not write (...) in a cultural vacuum. NICHOLASCAPALDI Queens College, CUNY Die Auseinandersetzung yon ldealismus und Realismus in Fichtes Wissenscha/tslehre. By Ingeborg Schfissler. (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1972. Pp. 182. DM 24.50) For Fichte scholars this closely argued and well organized study of the foundations of Fichte's Wissenscha/tslehre is simply a must. American philosophers generally, however, will not become Fichte enthusiasts after reading this book. But this is not the fault of the authoress, but of Fichte. The key question which Dr. SchiJssler raises is, What role does realism play in Fichte's transcendental idealism? With this question in mind she examines Fichte's "foundation of the entire theory of science" of 1794-1795 and related matters, and the "theory of science" of 1804, together with the lecture of 1813. As Fichte originally saw the task of philosophy it was to explain theoretical, i.e., scientific, consciousness in terms of its own foundation. In 1804, however, the task was conceived as presentation of absolute truth; and in 1813, Fichte tried to understand the theory of science as a theory of appearances. Dr. Schfissler's thesis is that all three approaches are necessary; that, in fact, the changes in Fichte's conception of what a theory of science is or ought to be are grounded in the nature of transcendental philosophy itself. The book is not something one reads for relaxation; its sustained and detailed arguments militate against that. But it is a highly illuminating study, and well worth the effort of careful analysis. W. H. WE~mSTBR Florida State University The Manifold in Perception. Theories of Art.from Kant to Hildebrand. By Michael Pedro. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972. Oxford-Warburg Studies) This is a survey of theories of art of Kant, Schiller, Herbart, Hildebrand, Schopenhauer and Fiedler. One may question the value of a re-statement of this sort, over simply another reading of the works of the authors themselves. Pedro's answer may be found in the Preface and again in a more extended statement in the conclusion. "German aesthetic theory from Kant through to the end of the nineteenth century seemed to contain valuable critical ideas quite absent from contemporary philosophical writing." Pedro's attempt has been to "re-locate notions in current use, like 'aesthetic detachment', within the sustained systematic discourse of which they were once part. This seemed a way both of uncovering a number of assumptions which have been constraining writing on art for some time, and of clarifying a number of crucial insights of earlier theorists." The author's account is almost entirely expository, its negative critical questions being limited almost exclusively to Herbart. Yet even here, when the author indicates that Herbart's theory of mind "exhibits certain very basic logical difficulties," he adds that... (shrink)

1. STRUCTURE AND REFERENCES 1.1. The main part of the dictionary consists of alphabetically arranged articles concerned with basic logical theories and some other selected topics. Within each article a set of concepts is defined in their mutual relations. This way of defining concepts in the context of a theory provides better understand ing of ideas than that provided by isolated short defmitions. A disadvantage of this method is that it takes more time to look something up inside an extensive (...) article. To reduce this disadvantage the following measures have been adopted. Each article is divided into numbered sections, the numbers, in boldface type, being addresses to which we refer. Those sections of larger articles which are divided at the first level, i.e. numbered with single numerals, have titles. Main sections are further subdivided, the subsections being numbered by numerals added to the main section number, e.g. I, 1.1, 1.2,..., 1.1.1, 1.1.2, and so on. A comprehensive subject index is supplied together with a glossary. The aim of the latter is to provide, if possible, short defmitions which sometimes may prove sufficient. As to the use of the glossary, see the comment preceding it. (shrink)

In my paper I review the main strategies adopted by two leading schools in cognitive science, symbolic artificial intelligence (AI) and connectionism, in modeling time-dependent phenomena such as learning. In particular, I briefly mention shortcomings of non-monotonic logic approach that dominates symbolic AI. I also discuss the problems that beset the recurrent networks approach advocated by connectionists (e.g., S. Grossberg) and philosophers (e.g., P. Churchland), who focus their attention on oscillatory behavior of such networks. I point out that neither approach (...) adequately captures essential features of the dynamics of human temporal awareness. Finally, I develop certain ideas borrowed from neurophysiologists (e.g., W. Freeman) and system theorists and describe the brain-mind, the entity that is capable of producing temporal awareness, as a self-organizing system that exhibits chaotic dynamics and generates a dynamic structure that resembles the chaotic hierarchy o Rossler. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:KARL ASCHENBRENNER, 19x 1-1988 Karl Aschenbrenner was born in Bison, Kansas, on November 20, 1911. He received the A. B. degree from Reed College in 1934 and his graduate degrees at Berkeley (M. A., 1938; Ph.D., 194o). After two years as an instructor at Reed College, he served in the U.S. Naval Reserve (Lieutenant in Meteorology ) from 1943 to 1946. From 1946 to 1948, he taught in the (...) Department of Speech at Berkeley and thereafter in the Department of Philosophy until his retirement in 1978. His teaching was devoted mainly to aesthetics and to the history of philosophy, most notably his course on Kant. For many years he was active as a trustee of the American Society for Aesthetics, and from 1961 as a member of the Journal's founding executive committee and, after incorporation, of the Board of Directors. Karl's first two years of attachment to theJournal coincided with service as chairman of the Department of Philosophy. This conjunction enabled him to be extraordinarily helpful in dealing with problems of bringing the Journal to birth--problems of funding, editorial appointments, publication policies, and business arrangements with the University of California Press. He welcomed the opportunity offered the Philosophy Department of collaborating in the publishing venture recommended by a special committee of the American Philosophical Association in 1958. The recognition early won by the Journal for its articles and reviews answered to his hope and work for success. At the annual meeting of the Board of Directors in San Francisco in 1987, the twenty-fifth birthday of the Journal was celebrated as was his twenty-seven years of diligent care for theJournafs excellence. Karl was a regular contributor to the philosophy series published by the University of California prior to three books issued by D. Reidel: The Concepts ofValue(1971), The ConceptsofCriticism(1974) and AnalysisofAppraisiveCharacterization (1983). He received Guggenheim, Fulbright, and NEH fellowships. Despite a physically disabling stroke in 1979, he continued his trips to Budapest which he began in 1972. He was concerned to study a non-IndoEuropean language spoken by people of European culture and had selected the Magyar tongue spoken in Hungary. He learned the language to test theories he advanced about appraisive concepts. He discovered in the structure of Magyar a mode of valuing embodied in verb usage differing significantly [333] 334 from the special appraisive vocabularies of English and German. Besides his lectures in Hungary, he responded to invitations to lecture received from universities in England, Austria, Poland, Bulgaria, and Romania. Shortly after his return to Budapest on his eleventh trip, he died of a massive stroke on July 4, 1988. He is buried there in a city he loved, especially for its music. He is survived by Marie, his wife of fifty-one years, and three children: Lisabeth, an attorney in Los Angeles; Peter, a judge in Fairbanks; and John, a composer in New York. E. W. STRONG... (shrink)

This study reports on action research efforts that were aimed at developing institutional arrangements beneficial for soil fertility improvement. Three stages of action research are described and analyzed. We initially began by bringing stakeholders together in a platform to engage in a collaborative design of new arrangements. However, this effort was stymied mainly because conditions conducive for learning and negotiation were lacking. We then proceeded to support experimentation with alternative arrangements initiated by individual landowners and migrant farmers. The implementation of (...) these arrangements too ran into difficulties due to intra-family dynamics and ambiguities regarding land tenure. Further investigations to find out how ambiguities could be tackled revealed that the local actors themselves had taken initiatives towards developing institutional innovations to reduce ambiguities. However, there is still considerable scope for further development of these self-organized innovations. The article ends with a reflection on inter-disciplinary action research, where it is argued that making “mistakes” is an inherent and necessary characteristic in action research that aims to address complex social issues. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Barrow and Newton E. W. STRONG As E. A. Buxrr HAS ADDUCED,Isaac Barrow (1630-1677) in his philosophy of space, time, and mathematical method strongly influenced the thinking of Newton: The recent publication of an early paper written by Newton (his De gravitatione et aequipondio fluidorum)2 affords evidence not known to Burtt of Newton's indebtedness in philosophy to Barrow, his teacher. Prior to its publication in 1962, this paper was (...) utilized by Alexandre Koyrd in his essay, "Newton and Descartes," 3 a study based on the third Horblit Lecture in the History of Science which he gave at Harvard University, March 8, 1961. Koyr8 maintains that there is a radical opposition in Newton's Principia not only to Descartes' purely scientific theories but also to the Cartesian philosophy. Yet, as he remarks, "we do not find in the Principia an open criticism of the philosophy of Descartes.... " He attributes this fact principally "to the very structure of the Principia: it is essentially a book on rational mechanics, which provides principles for physics and astronomy. In such a book there is a normal place for the discussion of Cartesian optics, but not of the conception of the relations of mind and body, and other such things." Koyrd asserts, nonetheless, that the criticism is not absent. It lurks in Newton's carefully worded definitions of fundamental concepts--those of space, time, motion, and matter--and becomes more apparent in the Optice of 1706 and in the second odition of the Principia. In support of this argument, he makes much of young Newton's unfini.~hed paper. He holds that this essay is of exceptional value "as it enables us to get some insight into the formation of Newton's thought, and to recognize that preoccupation with philosophic problems was not an external additatmentum but an integral dement of his thinking." 4 As concerns "young Newton's conception of space in its being and in its relation to God and time," Koyrd remarks that we learn from this essay The Metaphysical Foundations of Modern Physical Science (New York, 1927), p. 144. A. Rupert Hall and Marie Boas Hall, Unpublished Scientific Papers of Isaac Newton (Cambridge, 1962), Introduction, pp. 75-88; Latin text, pp. 90-121; English translation, pp. 121156. " Newtonian Studies (Harvard University Press, 1965), pp. 53-114. " Newtonian Studies, pp. 82-83. In his De gravitatione et aequipondio fluidorum, Newton is indeed engrossed with philosophic problems. With regard, however, to the announced purpose of his paper, namely, "to treat of the science of gravity and solid bodies in fluids by two methods," does Newton represent kis metaphysical "explanation of the nature of body" as an element of his science essential to its completeness7 He does not do so. At the end of his explanation he remarks: "I have already digressed enough; let us return to the main theme." He proceeds to set forth fifteen more definitions and then turns to the demonstration of two "Propositions on Non-Elastic Fluids." [155] 156 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY "that space is necessary, eternal, immutz~ble, and unmovable, that though we can imagine that there is nothing in space we cannot think space is not.., and that if there is no space, God would be nowhere. We learn also that all points of space are simultaneous and that, therefore, the divine omnipresence does not introduce composition in God.... " What we here learn from Newton about space in confutation of Descartes is to be found in Barrow's tenth mathematical lecture, "'Of Space, and Impenetrability." 5 In this lecture, Barrow opposes both Descartes and Hobbes. He objects, as does Newton, to the position taken by Descartes in his Principia Philosophiae, namely, "it is necessary.forMatter to be infinitely extended." He proceeds, as does Newton, to show how "very much Cartesius's great Subtility has failed him in this Case" to conclude that there is space empty of matter and distinct from magnitude from which an infinity of matter cannot be deduced. The correspondence of arguments tendered by Barrow and Newton indicates that the tenth lecture constituted a source from which Newton gleaned principal objections to Descartes' Principia Philosophiae. Although Koyr~ makes reference to Burtt's... (shrink)

Margolis's main concern is to clarify aesthetic terminology, and especially to distinguish between normative and descriptive uses of such terms as "taste" and "aesthetic." His own definition of a work of art, however, "an artifact considered with respect to its design," hardly improves on the definitions he criticizes. Some of the problems he discusses can be seen as versions of the One and the Many: e.g., the relation between a symphony and its different performances or between a poem and the (...) different interpretations it gives rise to. Among the more interesting chapters are those on figurative language and on "truth and reference in fiction."—W. B. K. (shrink)

This second chapter continues the inquiry into right started in the first, asking what makes right acts right. Historical attempts to state a single characteristic of all right actions that is the foundation of their rightness have been based on egoism and utilitarianism; these are not discussed except in so far as they are contrasted with the other theory put forward, which is G. E. Moore's theory suggesting that what makes actions right is that they are productive of good. The (...) main aspect of this addressed is that of duty, and the consideration leads to a rejection of the definition of right as just productive of the best possible consequences. The connection between the attributes of right and optimific is discussed, and the nature of acts that are right is explored in more detail. Two appendices follow Chapter II: the first discusses rights ; the second discusses punishment. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:274 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY poisoning, spying, etc., which would render postwar mutual confidence impossible, shall not be countenanced. It is mainly with an eye to these preliminary articles that Professor Wilhelm Miiller argues for Kant's relevance to contemporary political problems. Miiller begins by drawing an analogy between the Peace of Basle (1795) and the Treaty of Versailles: in both instances, it is claimed, secret reservations at the treaty table, (...) the identification of defeated nation with "guilty" nation, and the deprivation of an entire "guiltless" people of "the most primitive right to live" helped lay the foundations for future wars. Miiller sees in the willful dispersion, through motives of revenge and greed, of the possessions of conquered nations after both World Wars a "reversion to the wildest barbarism." He defends Kant's stricture against standing armies as being "simply and logically irrefutable" in spite of Kant's toleration--understandable in 1795--of limited and voluntary militias adequate for national defense. He infers from Kant's warning against national economic dependency the urgent need to exclude international capitalism from world politics. He suggests that Kant's principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of nations has been violated in the splitting of East from West Germany. And he insinuates that the present form of government in the U.S. is democratic and republican only in name, being in actuality a capitalist oligarchy whose two-party system tends to degenerate into a one-party system. Professor Miiller is entitled to his views. The reader, however, is entitled to a more objective exposition of Kant's essay and perhaps even to hope for a more critical and searching appraisal of Kant's doctrines. One opportunity for the latter surely offers itself in regard to Kant's analogy between personal and international morality. The analogy might conceivably break down over the difficulty of assigning collective moral and legal responsibility. If, as Kant maintains, a state is a moral person, it should follow that it and not merely its constituent members taken singly has moral responsibility for what it undertakes. Leaving aside the question of whether or not Kant thought through the implications of his premise, it is clear that Professor Miiller has not done so. Whereas he considers atrocious the branding of the German people as guilty of international crime in either World War, he allows himself the judgment that the "Christian" people of Europe and America were guilty of mass-murder on both occasions. The inconsistency is evident. Left unexamined and even unmentioned are the following: Kant's well-known ethical principles--the concept of practical reason, the phenomenal-noumenal duality, the notion of design in nature, the doctrine of the Categorical Imperative binding on any rational will--upon which he explicitly grounds Perpetual Peace; his efforts to refute the notion of theoretical conflict between morality and politics; his misleading use of the language of the social contract theorists throughout the essay; his proposal, anticipatory of later British philosophers, that the principle of publicity is a necessary if not sufficient condition of morally proper legislation. Perpetual Peace deserves more than Professor Mfiller has given it. PETER FUSS University of California, Riverside The Earlier Letters of John Stuart Mill 1812-1848. Edited by Francis E. Mineka, with an Introduction by F. A. Hayek. Two vols. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, Routledge g: Kegan Paul. Pp. xxvii + 784. $20.00.) These two volumes of early correspondence are the first volumes to appear of a projected new edition of Mill's collected works. If the subsequent volumes maintain the high level of competence achieved here, the new edition will prove a valuable assistance to nineteenth- BOOK REVIEWS 275 century scholars. Of the 537 letters published, 238 have never before been in print, and 72 others have hitherto appeared only in part. Most of the work of assembling the letters was done by F. A. Hayek, but the extremely useful annotation was prepared by Francis E. Mineka. We are told that he and Dwight N. Lindley are planning an edition of the later letters (1849-1873). The earliest letter extant (printed in facsimile and hitherto unpublished) was written, at the age of 6, to Bentham. It... (shrink)

With the resurgence in recent years of Hegelian studies a veritable spate of new translations have appeared of that philosopher’s works. For a long time we have had Wallace’s inimitable version of the lesser Logic and the main text of the Philosophy of Mind. We have had also Johnson and Struther’s translation of the greater Logic, Baillie’s Phenomenology, the History of Philosophy done by E. S. Haldane and The Philosophy of History by Sibree, not to mention various fragmentary editions of (...) the Introduction. Besides these there have been Sir Malcolm Knox’s excellent translations of the Rechtsphilosophie and, more recently, of Lectures on Aesthetics. But in the last few years A. V. Miller has given us a new and much improved version of the Science of Logic and the hitherto untranslated Philosophy of Nature as well as a new and revised edition of Wallace’s Encyclopaedia Logic and his Philosophy of Mind with the addition now of the Zusätze in English. At the same time another translation of the Naturphilosophie by Petry appeared, with voluminous historical and explanatory notes. Now attention is being given to the earlier works, and new translations have appeared, under the imprint of the State University of New York Press, of Hegel’s Differenz des Fichteschen und Schellingschen Systems der Philosophic and Glauben und Wissen, by Walter Cerf and Henry S. Harris, supplementing the Early Theological Writings earlier provided by Knox and Kroner. (shrink)

Neuroscience hasn’t shown how quite similar sensory circuits encode quite different colors and other qualia, nor how the unified pictorial form of images is encoded, nor how these codes yield conscious images. Neuroscience’s fixation here on cortical codes may be the culprit. Treating conscious images partly as retinal substances may avoid these problems. The evidence for conscious retinal images is that (a) the cortical codes for images are quite problematic, (b) injecting retinas with certain genes turns dichromats into trichromats without (...) cortical help, (c) retinas can discern colors by themselves without cortex, (d) retinal distortions appear in images but cortical distortions don’t, (e) retinal detectors support finely detailed colors, but V4 detectors don’t, due to their big receptive fields, (f) retinal activity has pictorial form, but viable cortical codes for pictorial form don’t exist. So, the colors and unified pictorial form of images arguably arise mainly across arrays of retinal detectors—not from abstract cortical codes. Images may be hidden in retinal activity beyond what EEGs show of it (cf. Strawson’s monism). Also, cortex refines these retinal images but cortical impairment (anesthesia, lesions, etc.) blocks awareness of them, for they’re no longer accessible to the mind’s subject-centered consciousness, resident in cortex. This proposal is largely testable and based in recent evidence. It avoids neuroscience’s elusive, problematic coded images and enigmatic explanations of how they become conscious. (shrink)

In this paper I wish to discuss a problem which, though it has not in the recent past attracted the attention of many philosophers, nevertheless, in my opinion, belongs quite clearly to that branch of the subject which should rightly be called “philosophy of history”: the problem, namely, of history's intelligibility. Two main questions can be asked about this which it is important that philosophers should answer. The first is that of whether history is intelligible in the sense that we (...) can find intelligible connections bètween all or any of its parts. The significance of this question is apparent enough; for has not one of the philosopher's most pressing problems since Hume's time been that of whether any such connections are traceable in the world of fact? It is true that almost every theory on this subject has been put forward after a consideration of the sphere of physical nature only; but because this procedure has been universally followed, it is not therefore to be accepted as right. For history too offers us facts, and it is at least possible that these differ in important ways from those to be met with in nature, with the result that we can discover other sorts of connection between them than those which the physical sciences recognize. The possibility would seem to be worth investigation, and it is with it that I shall be concerned in the first part of my paper. In the other half I deal with the second main question about historical intelligibility. Supposing that we can find some cases of historical events being intrinsically, i.e. intelligibly related, we can go on to ask whether history is intelligible in a more ultimate sense. Is history, we can now inquire, a thing which is essentially rational, or is the rationality we can find in it of a merely superficial character? To put the problem somewhat more fully, is the historian able to do more than see intrinsic connections between the events which he investigates: can he go further and understand the course of history as a whole, so that he is able to say, in the popular phrases, that history “makes sense,” is “meaningful” and “has rhyme and reason” in it? It seems to me that this is a matter which certainly ought to be discussed by philosophers, if only for the assertion of history's rationality which some philosophers have made. (shrink)